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THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE WAR.
BY
economics
THE
economist

A.

C.

1

VERRIJN STUART.

war

is not an alluring topic for a political
His proper task is to study the efforts
made for the advancement of human welfare, and to test the fitness
of whatever means may serve to promote such endeavors, whereas
an investigation of the economic aspect of war compels him rather

of

to discuss.

occupy himself with the destruction both of material and imis now taking place on a much larger scale
than ever before in the history of mankind. The task is all the
more painful, since when I have finished my discussion I shall
hardly be able to disclose a hopeful prospect for the future with any
to

material values that

degree of certainty.

And

yet

what Europe

is

now

experiencing cannot

interest the economist deeply, because the present
is

above

and in
narrow
details,

seems

I

me

Before

it

I

way

it is

conducted,

hope these will be sufficient to throw light on what
paramount issue.
take up the real subject in hand, I wish to make a

Whoever
is still

talks about the

war

in

a neutral

raging must of course speak with

only out of gratitude for the inestimable benefit of

if
I

hope

I

shall not transgress this

does not follow that

A

the

evident that within the

the

country while the conflict
restraint,

is

one cannot attempt to exhaust the prob-

few preliminary remarks.

neutrality.

It

to

can only give a few examples from the abundance of

but
to

in its origin, in

probable consequences.

limits of a lecture

One

lem.

an economic one

all
its

fail

monstrous struggle

it

is

foremost duty.

But

necessary sullenly and cowardly to con-

lecture delivered in Groningen before the student association "ConaC. A. Verrijn Stuart, Professor of Political Economy and StatisTranslated into English by
tics in the University of Groningen, Holland.
Dr. K. D. Biilbring, of the University of Bonn.
1

mur" by Dr.
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war and

ceal one's personal opinion about the cause of the
in

which

carried on.

is

it

way

the

In other neutral countries (Scandinavia,

Switzerland, not to mention the United States) the duty of neu-

does not appear to be thus understood, nor in the Nether-

trality

lands either, for here too

many newspapers

remarkable what

is

it

dare put before their readers without restraint.

But while expressing my opinion freely about this war I wish
add emphatically that it is not my intention to inquire into the
responsibility for what happened during the eventful days from
July 23 to August 1 of last year. We may confidently leave this
problem for later historians to solve, especially since its importance
to

From

can easily be overestimated.
explained

it

inevitability,

appears to

me

and

somewhat

that a

more minutely
come with a fatal

causes soon to be

war had

that the

to

different attitude

on the part of

one or another of the great powers during the sultry summer days
could not possibly have been of any importance except in so far
as on
to

be

may have depended

it

fired.

the

moment when

the

first

shot

was

In determining this point of time, each government, in

proportion to

its

must take

influence,

into consideration only the

own country, and need not for that reason be regarded by those who consider the war unavoidable as having been
interests of

more or

less

its

anxious for war.

In one respect
really

This

pathies.

originate

the

I

most confidently hope that

be neutral, and that

war

:

;

not too

is

in

is

suppressing

difficult

if

how sympathies

realize

namely, from pity for the sufferings of those engaged

from gratitude for

departments of

human

feelings of affinity

;

in

the excellent services in the highest

activity,

such as science,

inven-

art, technical

and so forth from race feeling and other
and from admiration for unimpaired vitality,

tions, political liberty

for

we

my expositions will
my personal sym-

;

magnanimous unity without

party-spirit where, interests of the

native country are at stake and in face of the calm acceptance of
the miseries

and ravages of war.

All these sentiments

cause of originating or strengthening sympathy.
be

difficult to find

It

any of the nations now engaged

may

be the

would therefore

in

war that

could

not lay claim to our sympathy for one reason or another.

Perhaps people

will

point

to

facts

that

sympathies which in themselves are surely
that in this respect extreme caution
in

Holland.

dicious

is

might weaken such
But I think

justified.

necessary, especially for us

Professor Simons has already warned against inju-

credulity,

belligerents based

even against believing the accusations against
on inquiries by various governments. Conflict-
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ogy of evidence furnishes ample proofs that

spot,
it

is
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and the psycholpossible even for

eye-witnesses to exciting facts to give virtually false evidence

in

perfectly good faith. 2

We

clear as far as can be

done whether one party of the belligerents

is

more
If,

blame

to

after

all,

leave

it

to later inquirers to

make

regard than another.

in this

the

may

war has been forced upon Germany

her wish she can plead self-defense with respect to

many

against

things

which might otherwise be severely condemned, for according to the
law of all nations this excuse secures immunity even as regards
deeds which in other circumstances are severely punished. Are we
to limit self-defense to the internal

maxim

supplement the undisputed

law of individual

states,

and

to

"Necessity knows no law," by

adding the words "but must not break a treaty"?
Moreover the two empires of central Europe have so far succeeded in mainly carrying on the war on hostile ground, and to

some extent

close to the

misery of war (for
cause

its

tiality, to

is

it

very nature

is

Dutch

Therefore the inevitable
war humanely, becharged, with inexorable par-

frontier.

impossible to carry on

inhuman)

is

the account of only one side of the belligerents;

and

just

because the Netherlands have been inundated with fugitives from
the scene of war, they are most imperfectly informed in this regard.
Is the fate of

East Prussia, Galicia and Bukowina

than that of the regions on the western front?
effect

of the steam roller that

was

to

move

less

What
in

deplorable

has been the

the direction of

Berlin and Vienna, as England and Erance hoped in the beginning

of the war?

Whose

heart does not ache

when he

those countries laid waste by the war?

and cruel

it

may

in

when once

it has broken out.
I regret
by endeavoring, particularly at
turn the dreadful misery of the war to literary

Dutch

the beginning, to

misery

sound, the wounds caused by war are only the

smaller part of the affair,
that our great

reads' of the

But, however paradoxical

daily press,

account, has thereby held the attention of the Dutch people so fixed

on

this aspect that they

of the time.

consequences painfully
I

2

have had no eye for the glorious greatness

This misconception must also eventually make

its

felt.

have spoken of the war as having been brought about by

Here

I should like to draAv attention to the important open letter, full of
and details, which Mr. James O'Donnell Bennett, correspondent to the
Chicago Tribune, addressed to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in Decemher, 1914.
As far as I know this letter was not mentioned in the Dutch press.

facts
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This statement will not be accepted by those

economic causes.

regard the struggle as directed against

Now

militarism.
in

understanding

I

German

who

(or, rather, Prussian)

must honestly confess thatT have not succeeded
watchword for the war.

this

one takes the word militarism to mean an antagonism, or at

If

between the military and civil parts of the populaone might suppose that it would manifest itself for instance in
England, where only a small proportion of the population take part
in the defense of the country of their own accord, as was also the
case elsewhere in earlier days (for instance in Napoleonic times).
least a separation,

tion,

But

in countries like the

France or Germany of to-day, where the

national defense involves the entire nation through

because

rests

it

all

its

classes,

on the universal personal and compulsory service

of the men, militarism in this sense

is

Has

simply impossible.

not

Germany manifested the astounding phenomenon that at the beginning of the war besides the millions of soldiers in her armies nearly
two

millions of volunteers

came forward?

—a

much

larger

number

than Kitchener's appeal brought together for "service abroad," and
that too in a country without conscription.

between people and army so perfect as
of militarism in this sense would

mean

in

Nowhere
Germany.

is

the unity

Annihilation

the annihilation of the whole

nation.

may, of course, occur even in Germany that professional
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, on account
of the cruel dangers of their calling, may claim certain privileges
which would not readily be granted in countries where for many
generations the army has had only garrison service to perform. Of
It

soldiers,

course

it

is

not generous to claim such privileges, but just as cer-

narrow-minded to measure the worth of culture in the
German nation by the attitude of a Prussian lieutenant!
And if we understand by militarism the effort of state and
citizens to put above all other duties the one which ensures the
highest possible power of defense, then it is not only an indispensable principle for Germany on account of her geographical
In
position and history, but one that applies to all great powers.
one of his latest statements, the Count de Mun 3 describes his English
allies as moved. "by noble solicitude for their national greatness."

tainly

is

it

Has not England, the one really imperial power, until very recently
made the open demand that her navy, the weapon on which her
safety chiefly depends, should be at least superior to a possible

combination of the navies of any other two powers?
3

Bulletin dcs armees,

August

19, 1914.
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no power above the sovereign state. It must
own power if it cannot rest on the conflicting
To rely solely on the authority of law is
interests of other states.
reality bring bitter disappointment, howmust
which
in
idealism
an
in
other respects. Even in ordinary legal
it
may
be
congenial
ever

There

maintain

is

in fact

itself

by

its

procedure one does not really take that risk. Doubtless most legal
and other obligations are fulfilled without requiring the interference

power of the state, but the very fact that this power exists
acts far beyond its express limits, even in cases where its assistance
might otherwise have to be called upon. There cannot be the least
doubt that if the law-courts, the police and the army were to disappear from a state the citizens themselves would take to arms.
Self-defense is the supreme instinct alike for states and individuals.
The parallel often drawn between the juridical intercourse of
nations and of persons is therefore in reality a comparison of two
of the

incomparable things, because

former case the impartial

in the

in-

And this is true for
struments of effective power are wanting.
If the rights or interests of certain persons
still another reason.
come

into conflict with the higher rights or interests of the state

there are

means and laws

to

make

in expropriation proceedings.

find in international

law?

If,

the former yield, as for instance

What

analogy to such cases can one

for example, the higher interests of

humanity demanded that France should hand over to other counsome part of her colonies which she may have conquered to

tries

a

much

larger extent than she

is

capable of developing to their

what means would there be to carry this out?
Finally, can any one seriously believe that such a war as is
now being waged can be the means of annihilating the militarism
of any nation involved in it? Homoeopathy is usually applied according to the principle of minimal and not of maximal doses.

best possibilities,

However one may wish

that the

war may pave

the

way

to

an

in-

ternationl intercourse based on co-operation, the consciousness of

the necessity for being always ready for
firmly

and

war has impressed

indelibly even on those nations

where

it

itself

did not exist

before, or only to a small extent.

we may look at it, it is evident from this
German militarism" is but a transparent
mask and means nothing else than war on Germany herself. This

From whatever

side

that the battle-cry "against

watchword,

first

originated by England, discloses clearly the real

object of the war, namely, to prove whether

and rapidly

Germany, as a strong
on an

rising power, shall be able to maintain herself

equal footing with England.

Viewed

in this light

it

follows clearly
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that the causes of the world-conflagration are chiefly of an economic

nature.

seems to

It

me

that

among

these causes one can distinguish

some of a general and others of a special character. First a few
words about general economic causes, which are really of but little
comprehension of this war, or of wars in
These are the capitalistic system of production, and profor the

significance

general.

tective tariff.

who are always inclined
human society to the account

Socialists
failings of

to

charge the faults and

of the great Carthago de-

lenda of capitalism, have not hesitated to do the same with ref-

Now it is worth noting that this accusation
comes from a group which has shown itself extremely combative
in social and national life, and whose system, if carried out by any
country, would surely involve serious danger in the way of foreign
complications.
Just think (to mention only one instance) of the
measures against the sweating system sure to be taken after the
war in countries with low wage-standards. But aside from this,
the enormous losses which the capitalists of all countries will have
to stand as a consequence of the war and which can be avoided by
only comparatively few industries can surely prove sufficiently that
capital receives no advantage from war, but only from the peaceThat war raises the rate of
ful development of economic life.
interest is an incontestable fact of great importance to all those
who can make newly formed capital productive. But the value
of all existing sources of fixed or slightly raised income is diminerence to the war.

ished by this

As

rise.

engaged in
whether
well be asked
a state of
as yet only a dream) would not

to the advantage accruing to those industries

producing war-materials,

it

may

armed peace (unarmed peace

is

serve their purposes just as well or better than a

war involving

all

Complaints are raised against the undue influence
exerted on public opinion through the press by manufacturers of
war materials. Are there not ways to counterbalance this ? Or
sorts of risks.

does any one think it is possible for any government in the present
century to go to war without being certain that they have the
people behind them?
It

seems to

German

me somewhat

naive to put

down

the four millions

democrats whose deputies have unanimously accepted the war-budget, as minors and blockheads misled by Krupp
and his abettors, or to regard their French colleagues, to whom
the same applies, as blind followers of Schneider-Creusot. In view
of

social

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE WAR.
of the

immense increase

power which any government

of

war, and which even

to gain in time of
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been so great that a purely

capitalistic

in

is

likely

Netherlands has

the

institution

like the

stock-

exchange has been obliged to surrender to the mercy of the Minister
of Finance as far as its opening and closing hours, the admission
or non-admission of shares and the fixing of minimum quotations
are concerned, one is inclined to look upon the war as serving the
interests of socialism rather than those of capitalism.
Another
reason for this is that the war will inevitable promote the democratization of political life in countries with compulsory service.
It
not only in social-democratic circles that the antiquated Prussian
system of election according to three grades of assessment is looked
upon as doomed to destruction on the battle-fields in the west and
is

east.

The case is somewhat different with protective tariff. There
no doubt that its object, which is to put the foreigner at an economic disadvantage as compared to the native citizens of a country,
is

Not

increases the chances for friction in international intercourse.

without reason does the motto of the Cobden Club mention
trade, peace

believe that

and good

we

will

among

nations" in one breath.

injure the good cause of free trade

exaggerated expectations about

its

if

we

hand also
which under

But

I

entertain

Protection has

success.

"free

its

root

partly in economic errors, but on the other

in precisely

those international conflicts of interests

certain cir-

cumstances lead to war.
belligerents

Among

have entered the

field,

the battle-cries with which the

there

that declares w-ar against protection.

bring us everlasting peace; and

it

none

in

my knowledge

greatly to be feared that after

protection will prove to

— for

psychology to begin with, but

to

Universal free trade will not

war the system of
number of countries

the termination of this

be strengthened in a

is

is

reasons of national

addition on account of empty

and the need for national defense. The international
atmosphere will not be of such a nature all at once that the foreigner
will forthwith be admitted on equal terms of trade in countries

treasuries

hitherto under a protective tariff.

Moreover, protection

is

not the

only method by which to draw considerable revenues from customs
duties, as

England can

testify.

But a protective

tariff yields

con-

siderable profits to the exchequer, unless so high as to be prohibitive.

England

run the risk again of seing her
by an enemy. She will doubtless
be able to promote the cultivation of cereals and fruits and the
breeding of cattle in a better and less expensive w ay for the people
Lastly,

will not care to

colonial food-supplies endangered

r

;
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than

Germany has done by

its

tariff,

may

of the question that England

and yet

I

cannot think

eventually introduce the

it

out

German

method.

Lambert, a manufacturer of Charlevoi,

in a recent

pamphlet,

argues appealingly for a world-congress which shall introduce and
safe-guard the policy of the open door in

all

colonies as a sure

and make lasting peace

do away
I wish with all my heart that this object could be attained
in such a comparatively simple way.
But I cannot think that it
would be a matter of indifference to the Netherlands, for instance,

means

with international greed

to

possible.

under such an international control of their colonial trade-policy
(which has been successful for the last forty years) the Dutch
East Indies should be divided between England and Japan on the

if

basis of a perfect equality
If,

as

we have

between Dutch and foreign importers.
two general economic causes cannot

seen, these

be made to explain the origin of this war,

it

nevertheless has

its

roots in economic causes of another kind, though not, to be sure,
exclusively.

A

historical event of such gigantic proportions obvious-

cannot be explained simply by causes of one kind. Motives of
an immaterial or ideal nature have doubtless a prominent share in
ly

Serbia's effort to escape,

Danube monarchy by
in the

from the domination of the

possible,

in one great federation
wish of France to make up for the defeat of 1870 and to

liberate Alsace-Lorraine

a

if

the union of

new conquest
But

all

Serbs

from German

rule

;

in Russia's

dream of

of Constantinople for the Greek orthodox Church.

in all of these considerations

economic interests also play

an important part for Serbia the desire to share in the world's
commerce without hindrance from Hungary, for which purpose,
not content with the route through Montenegro, she regards a port
of her own as indispensable for Russia likewise the urgent need
;

;

for a free access to the highways of traffic which

would not be

blocked by ice during part of the year nor lead past the forts of a

Barres

in

4

and for France, where even Maurice
the Echo de Paris* must confess his disappointment at the

naturally hostile foreign state

;

sentiment of the population in the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine,
their re-conquest

is

primarily of economic and strategic importance. 6

4 The fact that this goal will not be reached by obtaining possession of
the Dardanelles, since they but open into an inland sea both of whose entrances,
Gibraltar and Port Said, England holds in easy control, will sooner or later
be the cause of new wars. Russia's wishes can be satisfied only at the expense
of Sweden and Norway.
5 See the letter of the Paris correspondent in the Nieuive Rotterdamsche
Courant of December 29, 1914.
Is it not most tragic that the French have obtained this insight only by
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here alluded to between different
have led locally to armed encounters, though
the possibility of a fresh war over the left bank of the Rhine was
growing less every day but it is my firm conviction that the worldconflicts

states might,

it is

of

interests

true,

;

conflagration which broke out in the beginning of August,

1914,

and which has thrown the human race into the most tremendous
crisis that has ever come upon it is the consequence of the economic
antagonism between England and Germany and of the policy pursued by England on account of this for many years.
The remarkable increase in the population and economic life
in Germany which had begun as early as the foundation of the
German Zollverein continued after the peace of Frankfort at an
incredibly rapid pace.
Between 1871 and 1910 the number of inhabitants rose in Germany from 41 to 65 millions, in Great Britain
from 32 to 45 millions, and in France from 36 to 40 millions. This
increase of her population, finally almost at the rate of one million
souls per annum, placed upon Germany the necessity of exporting
either

men

or goods, as Caprivi once put

Without

it.

entirely neglecting the former,

striven after the latter alternative,

Germany has

chiefly

and has taken upon herself the

immense task of conquering the world-markets for her own products.
In so far as the attainment of this purpose was not hampered by the
policy of protection adopted in 1879, German trade and industry
vigorously supported by the government, have been surprisingly

Intimate touch between science and industry, unfailing
and energy, and a model organization these are the forces
that have promoted German trade, industry and shipping.
The
place in world-economics which has gradually been conceded to the
German empire is not due to any lucky chance but solely to her own
successful.

—

diligence

exertions.

The export

trade rose from an average of 2,357,000,000 marks

during the period from 1872 to 1875, to 8,246,000,000 marks in the
period from 1909 to 1913, therefore an increase of 250 percent. In
the

same period the exports of Great Britain rose from about

302,000,000 to 559,000,000 pounds sterling, or 85 percent
means of a new war

;

those of

for which billions of francs have been sacrificed ? As far
Alsace is concerned this insight might have been gained in a different
manner. In the Journal de la Socicte de Staiistique de Paris, Hnber not long
ago published the figures of the German census of 1910, showing that French
is the mother tongue of 3.8 percent of the inhabitants in Lower Alsace, of
of 8.6 percent in Upper Alsace and of 22.3 percent in Lorraine.
Is it quite
inconceivable that if France had guarded herself against such disappointments
as this of M. Barres much would have been different in the political development of the last twenty years?
as

;
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France from about 3,781,000,000 to 6,323,000,000 francs, about 68
percent increase.

The

British empire, which

had held an unchallenged supremacy
and shipping ever since the end of the eighteenth
century, began to feel that a powerful, well-equipped rival had
sprung up at her side. German exports to the value of 727,000,000
marks found their way to England in 1889 and 1,880,000,000 in
1913 and whereas Germany's share in the entire commerce of the
world rose from 10 percent in 1886-1890, to 12.9 percent in the year
1912, England's share went down in the same time from 19.6 to
16.6 percent, and that of France from 9.5 to 9.0 percent. The
moment was rapidly approaching when German exports would
exceed those of England in actual amount. In 1913 the former
amounted to 10,097,000,000, the latter to 10,719,000,000 marks. It
is true that in the shipping line England is still facile princeps, but
in industry, trade

;

here also the figures show that the progress in

Germany has been

more rapid than in England. The volume of the mercantile
fleet rose from 4,000,000 to 11,000,000 registered tonnage in England in the years from 1885 to 1913, or from 100 to 275 percent
in Germany from 400,000 to 2,700,000 tons, or from 100 to 675
far

percent.

The movement

to which these figures testify found its explanatremendous rise of German industry. Here too
I shall only mention a few figures from the abundance of the
material. I only wish to point out that the coal production of Great
Britain which in 1887 was still double that of Germany, was exceeded by the latter as early as 1912. England produced 7,700,000
tons of pig iron in 1887 and Germany 4,000,000 tons for 1912 the
The defigures were 9,000,000 and 17,600,000 tons respectively.

tion chiefly in the

;

velopment of the steel industry is even more wonderful.
England produced 3,200,000 tons and Germany 1,200,000,

000 and 17,300,000 tons in 1912.
The number of looms in the

from 4,200,000

in

textile factories in

1875 to 11,400,000

in 1914, in

In 1887
to 6,600-

Germany

rose

Great Britain from

41,900,000 (1874) to 56,000,000, an increase of 171 and 34 percent
In other industrial branches, especially in chemistry,
respectively.
the

same proportion

The

is

to be noted.

rapid development

of

German economic

life

naturally

brought great national prosperity, and the German national capital
began to exceed that of the English in absolute figures. According
to a reliable estimate the figures in 1913

13,000,000,000 pounds

sterling.

were 15,500,000,000 and
of England is still 25

The wealth
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Germany; hut on

the other hand

percent higher per capita than

in

we must hear in mind that Germany has invested her capital at
home to a much larger extent.
From the foregoing examples which might easily he multiplied,
is evident, I think, that an economic community with a fabulous
power of expansion had arisen by the side of England. There is
no doubt but it was to the interest of all mankind that this flourishit

ing development should not be stopped, for it brought forth much
good fruit far beyond the borders of its own country. I need not

prove in detail that this

is

true as far as the Netherlands are con-

Every one who is in the least familiar with economic
theories knows that if productive energy, hitherto latent or manifesting itself only imperfectly, finally comes somewhere to full development, the struggle against a deficit in the economic budget of
the world (which is based on the exchange of goods and labor) is
everywhere promoted. England found in Germany one of her best
customers, who by buying 7 .8 percent of England's export in 1913,
took her place immediately after the British colonies and possessions.
Short-sighted people, however, thought differently and in the
rise of a new rival saw first of all losses for their own country.
Instead of trying by supreme efforts in the lines of industry and
commerce to maintain and extend her threatened markets, England
cerned.

strove to obtain her object of safeguarding her preeminence in the

economic sphere by checking the possibilities of trade for her competitor.
The Merchandise Marks" Act of August 23, 1887, which
was intended to warn the English buyer against buying German
goods imported under English trademarks, had had just the opposite
effect, for it then became evident that all sorts of goods, which up
to that time had passed as of purely English make, had really come
from Germany. In 1896 E. E. Williams published his alarming
pamphlet,

Made

in

Germany and a few
;

years later, in 1903, under

Chamberlain began the
to bring about a
closer union between the mother-country and her colonies by offering special inducements in the treatment of imports, and by handicapping foreign competitors, especially Germany.
These attempts have so far suffered defeat in England in three
successive elections. But their advocates have won many adherents,
for the desire to block German progress has dominated English
politics in an increasing measure.
Bismarck at first opposed the plan of a firm colonial policy and
found the peaceful establishment of commercial settlements suffithe strong and suggestive leadership
activity of the tariff

reformers

of

who endeavored
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cient to secure for the

empire a proper share of the trade with those

parts of the earth newly opened to

came

clear that colonies of her

And

traffic.

own would

later,

when

be, if not the only

it

be-

means

any rate very efficient ones, Germany
found England and France everywhere in her way. In dividing up
the still unappropriated regions of the earth, not only England but
especially France has greatly enlarged her colonial territory, large
as it was before. Tunis (1881), Tonquin and the Congo districts
(1884), Senegal (1889-1893), Dahomey and Mauretania (1893),
and Madagascar (1896) were, added, not to mention smaller territories, although the stationary population of the mother-country is
not sufficient to bring about a strong, spontaneous development of

to accomplish this purpose, at

the

new

territory. 7

In the interest of the peaceful development of the world's trade
it

would have been desirable

if

Germany could have secured

for

herself at that time a considerable part of this great colonial territory,

which

is

not least important for France as a never-failing source

now remained

for Germany only comwere of very little value.
Kiao-chow which has been snatched from her by Japan without
any direct connection with the European war, formed a very valuable exception.
It was in German possession for about fifteen
years, and in that short time developed into a model commercial
colony.
Since 1901 the volume of trade had increased elevenfold,
and in the end it had almost reached that of all the other German

for recruiting her army. There

paratively small pieces, which on the whole

colonies put together.

And

even where Germany wanted to open up new regions to
any intention of making direct settlements,

world-traffic, without

she experienced the powerful resistance of England and France.

One need

only think of the long history of the Bagdad railway.

In 1904 the Anglo-French agreement about Africa was con-

According to its conditions England, fearing that Germany
might some day gain a foothold on the other side of Gibraltar, gave
her sanction to the active collaboration of France with the Sultan
of Morocco in carrying out administrative, economic and military
cluded.

7
The French colonial territory (not counting Algiers, Morocco and the
Sahara) according to the latest information comprises an area of 2,800,000
geographical square miles and a population of 34,600,000 inhabitants. The corresponding German figures are 1,000,000 and 12,000,000. The rapid economic
development of the German colonies, all acquired within the last thirty years,
is evident from the fact that the whole volume of colonial trade had reached
464,500,000 marks in 1912, that of the much larger and older French colonial
territory (not including Algiers and Morocco) 1,856,000,000 francs or 1,485000,000 marks.
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return for the recognition by France of

England's actual sovereignty over Egypt.
attention

had

in

In this settlement no
economic interests which Germany also
"Without any question the object was to work as

was paid

Morocco.

much as possible
man empire.

to the

against the flourishing development of the Ger-

But Germany's spontaneous

was stronger than the presand when she began to complete her immense continental military power (which has come so
conspicuously to the fore in the last months) by building a navy
with which to protect her fast growing trade and her shipping
interests, a navy of which England could not assert that it had
aggressive intentions on account of its moderate size, s Germany
began to be systematically hemmed in on all sides and began also
both openly and secretly to offer resistance.
Germany has never been imperialistic like England in the sense
of striving after an extension of her frontiers and the formation
of a world-empire.
She desired no increase of territory within
Europe, and she knew very well that she could not make any conquests outside of Europe against the will of England. But England
cannot permit a rival of equal rank in trade or shipping on the
continent, and especially not if that rival happen to possess colonial
ambitions.
This is evident from English history throughout its
entire extent. First, in the sixteenth century, England broke Spain's
power by the help of Holland. Then, when Holland had become the
first commercial power in Europe there followed the Navigation
Act, and from 1652 to 1674 there were three wars between Holland
and England which drove Holland forever into the background.
After this, the supremacy of the French was curtailed and finally
after a series of wars England acquired it for herself on the field
sure that hampered her

f roiii

vitality

outside

;

of Waterloo.

Xow

Germany's turn has come, and eventually England may
with Russia, should she emerge victorious from the
present struggle.
Naturally England would have preferred to obtain her object, to prevent the development of Germany, without
war. For this purpose she made use of two kinds of currents hostile
to Germany. A glance at the map is sufficient to show that Germany
cannot give up Austria-Hungary, the only ally on whom she can
count with certainty, and whose twelve millions of German inhabitants make up the largest of her various groups of people. To keep
have to

settle

8 Von Tirpitz as well
as Von Jagow agreed to Churchill's suggestion that
the ratio of battle-ships should be 16 10.
:

:
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Danube-Monarchy a strong power, to make sure of her friendand loyalty, and to support her foreign policy as far as possible
these are really vital interests for Germany. Now, since the Balkan
the

ship

policies

of Austria-Hungary and Russia necessarily diverge, the

German

alliance with Austria

was incompatible with fostering closer
Even Bismarck could not be insensible to the logic of that fact and while
he was still chancellor he saw the first French loan of millions of
francs on their way to Russia.
It was inevitable that the Russian policy in the Balkans, though
relations

between Germany and the empire of the Czar.

;

directed in the

first

instance against Austria-Hungary, should react

—

on Russian feeling against Germany, especially since Russia nursed
an old grudge against Germany because the latter nation had failed
to consider Russian interests sufficiently at the Berlin congress in
1879.
Soon afterward Russia conceived the idea of coming into
closer touch with France, who might perhaps be prevailed upon to
give up her great riches, which Russia urgently needed for the
development of her immense resources, in return for the promise
of assistance when she should be ready to take revenge on Germany
for the losses of 1870. In 1888 the first Russian loan was arranged
with France, and it was soon followed by other and larger ones, so
that the amount of Russian bonds in French possession has risen to
twenty milliards of francs. As early as 1894 this financial alliance

had developed into a political defensive alliance.
England tried to get into connection with both these powers
and succeeded first with France. For a moment Fashoda (1898)
threatened to bring once more into serious conflict the two countries
that had so often contended against each other but France yielded,
and soon after the accession of Edward VII in 1901, the negotiations led to the desired Entente, as became evident to every one
in 1904 from the Morocco treaty which put an end to the last differIn spite of the Doggerbank incident with the Russian Arences.
mada ( 1904) in which England showed remarkable forbearance, the
Anglo-Russian treaty concerning Persia (1907) was concluded,
though not without opposition from the press, e. g., The Economist
realized perfectly well whither this policy must eventualy lead.
In
that treaty, Persia, 9 though with a certain respect for its integrity,
was divided into three portions, of which the largest northerly one
was recognized as belonging to the Russian sphere of influence, the
;

Readers may remember the courageous pamphlet which W. Morgan
in 1912 under the title The Strangling of Persia.
It was
discussed in the Dutch press at the time.

Schuster published
fully
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was
between the two others. This
agreement paved the way to the Entente with Russia, concluded
Lastly the
during the visit of Edward ATI at Reval in 1908.
Balkan alliance lately formed under the lead of Russia was bound
to neutralize the influence of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and
southern part

fell to

the share of England, while the middle one

to serve as a neutral buffer-zone

to

weaken the prestige of

that empire, and, indirectly, of

Germany

as well.

Thus Germany was driven
like

into a

dangerous position which,

overpressure on the safety-valve of a steam-engine, could not

but lead to an explosion.

A

state with such strong natural

power

of expansion in the economic sphere cannot be pushed back indefinitely

without fighting.

Certainly

Germanv has been

throughout the reign of William

a

sincerely peace-loving nation

II.

The government knew very

well that in order to reap the fruits of her tremendous economic
efforts the

country required peace and tranquillity

first

of

all,

and

so they acted accordingly.

But of course the empire had to maintain her place as a great
power with all the authority to which she could lay claim. And
the blunt honesty

sometimes

— not

—

always as tactful as it might be of her
harsh words, could easily create

gruff behavior and

the impression that

famous speech

Germany was

at the city hall of

ferred to the Niebelung faith of

not averse to war.

Thus

Vienna

emperor

in 1908, the

Germany

in

coming

to

her

in his

re-

ally's

armor and guarding her from danger, at the time
when Russia was threatening to make a casus belli out of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although this was but the

aid in shining

natural outcome of thirty years of valuable civilizing labor
success

is

clear to every one

who

will

whose
compare the present condi-

tion of these regions with that of Servia, also

born at the Berlin

when the French
open door established in the Algeciras Treaty, but further restricted between France
and Germany in 1909 led to the Agadir incident and the more
exact agreement of November 1911.
But when in 1913 AustriaHungary momentarily endangered the peace of Europe by desiring

congress.

Another instance occurred

method of putting

in

1911,

in practice the policy of the

—

—

Germany frustrated her plan
by sending the emperor's well-known telegram to King Karol,
although in so doing she imperiled her friendlv relations with her
a revision of the peace of Bukharest,

ally.

Germanv has been readv

for war.

if

you

like,

for the last fortv-

!
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we must not forget that only one third of the
Wehrbeitrag (1913) had heen paid when the war broke out. This
contribution amounted in full to a milliard marks and was meant
to cover the expenses of Austria-Hungary's loss of strength through
recent events in the Balkans. The second third, according to section
51 of the act, was due by February 15, 1915, and the third by
February 15, 1916. Therefore, Germany certainly was not quite
four years, though

as prepared as she ought to have been

for the emergency of a

war on one or more frontiers but no more were the other
powers. However, to be ready for war and to be eager for war
are two very different things. Had Germany really been eager for
possible

war,

;

how

is

it

that she let slip the favorable opportunity furnished

by the Fashoda incident, or the Russian revolution after the war
with Japan, during which, moreover, she even protected Russia's
western frontier against Austria? Indeed, Germany's fundamental
love of peace cannot be doubted, and the same feeling certainly
existed also in other quarters.
But since England with the cooperation of France and Russia had so intensified even politically
the antagonism of economic interests, a settlement by arms was
bound to follow sooner or later, though later historians may possibly
show that even in July of 1914 there might have been some chance

And as soon as the
Serajavo had brought the central powers of Europe into

of postponing

murder

at

it

for a

a conflict with Russia

little

while longer. 10

and with France, her unfortunate

ally,

only a logical conclusion of English policy, 11 directed by Sir

it

was

Edward

Grey himself since December 17, 1905, that on August 1 he should
refuse (as shown by the English Blue Book, No. 123) to inform
Prince Lichnowsky of the conditions under which England would
remain neutral, or to make a promise of neutrality in case Belgium's
neutrality should be respected and the integrity of France and her
This at once brands as untenable the claim
colonies guaranteed.

England went

that

to

war for
was so

suffered so severely and

has been asserted that Sir

Belgium, which has

the sake of

feebly defended by her

Edward Grey

allies.

It

refused the expected an-

there can be no question that Germany could have avoided the
For this end, it is
time had she wished to do so at any price
true,
all that would have been necessary
as simple-minded people believed
would be to have declared in Vienna that now with Russia threatening to
interfere by force if the Serbian ultimatum were not withdrawn, Germany's
assistance must not be relied upon, and that perhaps the possibility of an armed
action together with Russia might even be expected
13 A conclusion for which three members of the English cabinet, Morley
(the biographer of Cobden and Gladstone, "honest John" as he is called in
England), Trevelyan (the biographer of Bright) and Burns, the former leader
of the labor party, refused to take the responsibility.
10

war

Of course

at that

—

!

—

!
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swer because he knew that the German ambassador did not at the
time speak on behalf of his government but in his own name. This
way of putting it seems to me psychologically unsound. On the
contrary Sir Edward Grey might easily have made a promise of
neutrality containing whatever conditions he thought necessary, while
reserving for himself the privilege of taking any final decision which
might prove necessary or desirable in case the ambassador should be
denied by his government.
Thus the conflict between the two nations is based upon the
deeply rooted antagonism between their interests.
It has, moreover, been proved by a remarkable letter written on July 30, 1914,
by M. de L'Escaille, the Belgian ambassador at St. Petersburg, to
his government, but intercepted and published by Germany without
its

genuineness being ever denied, that the assurance Russia had

England would side with France, was considered
and did much to increase the influence of the war party

received that
decisive

in Russia.

that

is

it

If these things are duly considered,

the quarrel between

I

think

Germany and England

we may
was

that

say
at

the very root of the conflict which has since assumed such great

From

dimensions.

the agreement

peace should be concluded,
political lead in this

war.

it

is

made

in

London

that no separate

evident that England has taken the

For her the

issue

is

the unabated main-

tenance of her supremacy and the further extension of her colonial
empire for Germany the issue is therefore above all, to break the
;

English spell in order to gain recogniton on equal terms with England as a great power in world politics and to put an end to England's uncontested lordship of the seas.

Can we then

believe that

it

is

in the interest of the small states,

particularly those with large colonial possessions, for the

empire to be vanquished and

all

German

counterpoise against British domina-

tion to be thereby annihilated for the near future?

Can we

believe

United States is a match for England and her eastern ally?
On the other hand no one can imagine such a complete victory of the
central powers that England would lose her place as a great power.
And we may suppose that Germany has come to realize sufficiently

that the

well

how

valuable in facilitating the defense of her

is

a circle of really independent neutral small states.

is

in perfect

In

my

presented.

own

frontiers

opinion the manner in which the

war is being conducted
harmony with the view of the root of the quarrel here
While England has left the fighting for the most part

to her allies

for the present, she has set herself the task of ex-

hausting the economic power of Germany.

From

the very begin-
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ning of the war, she proceeded in various ways to carry out this

purpose: by cutting the German cable; by forbidding her subjects

under severe penalty to carry on any business with the Germans
or to pay them any money; by enforcing prize courts, although we
may be sure that England herself will be the first to abolish the
custom if she loses her supremacy at sea by hampering commerce
in various ways with utter disregard for the rights of non-combatants and neutral nations by extending the list of contraband
goods far beyond the limits acknowledged by international law.
To my mind it is such measures as these which have caused many
sincerely neutral persons in Scandinavia, Holland and elsewhere
to sigh, "If only the building of the German navy had progressed
at a quicker rate and on a larger scale!"
The London Economist
in
not
far
when
it
complained
its
issue of January 16,
did
go too
of
naval
warfare
could be called
1915, that the international law
;

;

nothing but a "rag."

Moreover, England has taken a number of measures with the
intention of winning for herself that share in the world's

which Germany

loses,

and

if

Germans from English business
a footing in

employers

I

it.

from

will only

their

commerce

and to banish
so far as they had gained

possible even more,
life

in

mention here the release of English

contracts

toward German employees

;

the

cancelling, for the duration of the war, of patent rights acquired

by Germans

and an officially organized system of inand packings in which the Germans had
been so successful in the markets of the world.
It is not my task to pass judgment on this conduct nor to
answer the question whether England will not soon realize that by
her own actions she has thus cut off her nose to spite her face and
in

England

;

struction about trademarks

damaged very important English interests. Will the policy of
company meet with the same confidence
abroad after the war as heretofore, when it becomes evident that
payments due from it to citizens of a hostile country are now kept
back ?
Heretofore a "bill on London" bearing reliable endorsements was worth its face value in gold in international trade, because it was known that the amount would be paid down in gold
when due. Will not this mode of exchange, which has been so
popular that London has been until now the first clearing-house
of the world, have lost some of its attraction after the war, for
has

a British life insurance

the reason that England

now

refuses to meet

its bills

if subjects of a hostile country have had a share
upon which the claim is based?

of exchange

in the transaction

!
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war

this sort
its

403

;

but

it is

worth

chief object, the ex-

haustion of Germany, does not begin to be even dimly in sight.

me to be a new and striking proof of the enormous
development of economic life in that country. Formerly it was
often thought that a modern war could not possibly last long,
especially one involving five great powers and four smaller ones.
I have never shared this view, though we cannot easily imagine a
war of the magnitude of the present one lasting for thirty years or
even for seven. In my article in the September issue of the Dutch
This seems to

Ekonomist,

I

have termed the possible duration of the war rather

a question of national psychology than of national economy.

my

opinion, in which

And

have been confirmed by later
experience, unless the new phase of the war, started a few days
ago in the Irish sea, whereby Germany has turned against its originator a plan of war first adopted by England, should seriously
In this case
threaten or entirely cut off the imports to England.
the war might rapidly come to an end for economic reasons. 12
As a matter of fact there is not the slightest danger of starving
out Germany. For a time, to be sure, there will be a change in her
methods of food-supply. It is certainly true that Germany gets
about half of her wheat from abroad and barley in still larger proportion. But these facts are met by some others first, by the fact
that the per capita consumption of wheat and rye in Germany is
about fifty percent higher than in England, whereas the consumption of meat is about the same in both countries. This is due to the
fact that large quantities of rye are used for cattle-feeding in Germany. If necessary the quantity of grain available for bread could
be increased by butchering cattle from time to time and smoking
the meat, and this would also increase the supply of meat for consumption. Moreover, Germany is the chief sugar-importing country
of Europe and now that England, the largest buyer of German
sugar, refuses it, the domestic consumption of this excellent food
can increase in Germany, and inferior qualities (molasses) can be
used for cattle-feeding. Lastly one must consider that huge quanIf necessary the
tities of barley are regularly used in breweries.
quantities of grain available for other purposes can also be increased
this is still

I

:

;

by restricting the production of beer. 13
12

food for thought that at the mere announcement
against merchant vessels the British admiralty,
without regard to neutral interests, thought it necessary to advise shipping
companies to continue their sailings but under a false flag
of a

In this connection

it

is

German submarine war

—

13

This restriction has since been ordered.

—
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Certainly no one can deny that the war puts tremendously
heavy burdens and gigantic losses on the central powers of Europe
as well.
In my article in the Ekoiwmist, mentioned above, I ventured to find the economic significance of the war in the fact that
it is

a sudden, forced shifting of a very large part of the productive

energy of the countries involved
tion of ideal possessions for

in

it

in the direction of a

which the struggle

a production which, as long as

obtaining the object of the war,

is

produc-

being fought,

mankind knows no other means of
is

only possible at the sacrifice of

the cost of production of a very special kind and of tremendous

amount.

The

expenses, as far as they can be covered by money, are

by that portion of the income of the people
which the nation is able and willing to spare for this purpose for
some time. This portion is very large in England and in France,
but certainly no less in Germany, where the whole nation is firmly
convinced that it is engaged in a war of self-defense forced upon
it from outside, in which its position as a great power is at stake.
The average income of the German people, according to Dr. Helfferich, has risen from 445 marks per capita in 1896 to 642 marks in
1913. There can be no doubt that it is now greatly reduced by the
war, but even a large portion of the revenue of 1896 will be available for the state should necessity demand it.
Suppose that the
difference between these two figures can be sacrificed temporarily
in the service of the fatherland, this would make about 14,000,000000 marks, an amount naturally increased by the value of the requisitions in the newly occupied territories, in so far as these are paid
only provisionally by vouchers that do not need to be redeemed
until after the war.
Moreover in all countries the war is carried
on by all sorts of credit, by drafts on the future, which will press
heavily on the economic life of the nation after the conclusion of
Germany is well
peace, whatever the issue of the war may be.
prepared to liquidate this credit. The Reichsbank has a far larger
reserve of gold than the Bank of England (108,000,000 as against
14
I think
69,000,000 pounds sterling at the close of January, 1915).
there is no doubt that Germany will be able to carry on the war (the
immediate costs of which are estimated at about 7,000,000,000 marks
a quarter), at least for one year without there being any question

borne

in the first place

of exhaustion.
If exhaustion
14

should come

at

some future day,

will

Germany

Even taking into account the gold-reserve of the private banks in England and the amount still in circulation in Germany, the balance is very probably in favor of Germany. However, Germany's allies are much weaker in this
respect than are England's.
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Will not France and Russia

fall vic-

tims to it, where rich industrial districts have been occupied by the
enemy for months past? Especially in Russia is an early exhaustion
more probable than in Germany. During the winter Russia is en1

"'

from the outer world, including her allies. Railway
communication via the north of Sweden (now closed for the transportation of war material) and via Yladivostock are quite insufficient for the needs of this great empire, and transportation by way
of Archangel is available only in the warmer season and has also

tirely cut oft

but a very limited capacity.

was much more incomplete
world's intercourse

now
own

is

The economic preparation for the war
Her isolation from the
in Russia.

of advantage to Russia in so far as she can

apply her harvests

(unsatisfactory in

entirely to her

1914)

purposes, whereas in normal times they were used for the most

part to pay the interest on the foreign debts of the nation.

England, that up to

this

the Czar's empire, placed 12,000,000 pounds sterling at

as early as December, 1914, for the

Nor should

coupons.

it

Russia are never safe.

But

time had not been one of the creditors of
its

disposal

payment of the Russian January

be forgotten that the internal conditions of

She

is

the only country

democrats have not voted the war loans desired.

where the social
It was therefore

a wise precaution to prohibit alcoholic drinks at the beginning of the

war, a measure that has apparently been well carried out.

But

this

prohibition cost the empire a revenue estimated at 936,000,000 rubles

for 1914.

No
tative

—though England has been warned from an authoriGermany's
The
resources — the expenses of the war are immense.

doubt

quarter not to expect an early exhaustion of

financial

estimates of the direct and indirect costs to
tries

together

all

the belligerent coun-

(including the losses in trade and industry)

from 30,000,000,000 (Wolf)

per half year [$12,000,000,000 to $20,400,000,000].
ures of whose gigantic size

vary
(Guyot) 16
These are fig-

to 51,000,000,000 guilders

we

shall

perhaps get the clearest idea

A

15
remarkable view (a symptom too that the comparative distribution
of the advantages and drawbacks of the war was no longer left to Count Witte)
is contained in a letter from the French correspondent of the English Economist in the issue of January 26, 1915. Some figures he gives concerning the
great reduction in the yield of French taxes and in the volume of French
trade in 1914 go, in his opinion, to prove "lunv enviable is the position of
411 over France!' he comGreat Britain in comparison to that of France
plains, "the workers arc gone, and in many departments every kind of commercial and industrial activity is at an end, while the transport service is*
Morover Germany zvas one of France's best cusseriously disorganized.
tomers."
16

His estimate includes the capitalized value of the human

lives lost.
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if I

place beside

them the

railway system including
bridges

—and

stations,

fact that the costs of the
all

construction-work

amounted

whole European

—tunnels,

viaducts,

to 66,000,000,000 guilders at the

end of 1912 [$26,400,000,000]. And the end is not yet in sight.
This world-war, whatever its end may be, will certainly press
heavily on economic life for years. The mere fact that the payment
of its expenses is for the most part put off till after the close of the
war must lead to this result, as I have just said. I for my part
cannot believe in a rapid recovery of the world's economics immediately after such tremendous breaches have been made in the male
population of the most efficient periods of life, and in the available
capital which has suffered from the destruction of buildings, railways, fields, horses, etc., and from the one-sided and gigantic increase in the consumption of war-materials of every kind.

might be different if war materials did not have to be reBut is there the very remotest prospect of this? Certainly
we Dutch people are better situated in this respect than the nations
engaged in the war, if we can continue to prevent the spread of the
world-conflagration to our territory but we too are hard hit by the
fact that a large part of our best customers abroad will be immensely
It

placed.

;

must confess that what of all
the consequences of the war disquiets me most is the reaction it will,
in my opinion, have on the size and distribution of the national resources for some years after peace has been concluded. Hard times,
socially and economically, are before us.
For the rest, I do not propose to enlarge now on the consequences of the war. Reflections on this topic necessarily bear a
very speculative character as nothing whatever can be said with
certainty about the duration of the war or the circumstances under
which it will end. There are well meaning patriots who even now
dream and write of a European federation, founded on the principle
of nationality, that shall emerge as a welcome result of this conflict.
If the realization of such an idea should come to pass the most farreaching economic consequences would be bound to ensue. But the
attainment of this ideal presupposes the dissolution of Russia and
Austria-Hungary (since both states are conglomerates of many
nationalities), entailing complete exclusion of Austria-Hungary from
access to the sea, and important changes in the boundaries of these
countries, and of the Balkan States, Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. Its realization demands singleimpaired in their buying powers.

I

hearted collaboration in the service of the higher interests of

civili-

zation on the part of those nations at present separated by abysses
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of hatred which can only be bridged after the strenuous exertion

of the best efforts of

all

countries

for

many

long-

years.

This

removed from all reality that T forego the task of
pointing out the enormous practical difficulties with which it would
ideal

is

so far

be confronted at he outset.

Let

me

say only this in conclusion.

Could the peace that

is

bound to come some day be one not of negative character only
(non-war), but as in 1866 a substantial and positive one a peace

—

—

—

which from the nature of the conditions imposed and accepted
at least some
would
not
constitute
an immeof the belligerents a peace which
diate new danger to European safety by reducing Germany to the
boundaries she had before 1870 or even narrower ones a peace,
finally, which by abolishing prize courts and establishing a balance
of pow er at sea so urgently needed by the smaller states as well
would contain in it the germ of a limitation of armaments which
would only then be possible then the night of terror that humanity
is at present living through would prove, though after a wearisome

would pave

the

way

to a better

understanding between

;

;

r

—

period of transition, to be the herald of a

morn

full

of promise.

